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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joaquin Garza was charged with committing the crime of aggravated battery 
under the alternative theories that he either committed the battery himself, or that he 
aided and abetted another in doing so. Mr. Garza testified on his own behalf and 
maintained his innocence. Over defense counsel's objection, the district court allowed 
the prosecutor to present evidence that Mr. Garza was a convicted felon, ostensibly to 
impeach his credibility. Mr. Garza asserts that the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing the prosecutor to present this evidence, because his prior conviction was for a 
crime of violence and, thus, did not weigh on his credibility. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Garza was charged by Information with the crime of aggravated battery 
under the alternative theories that he either struck the victim himself or that he aided 
and abetted another in doing so. (R., pp.25-26.) The prosecutor later added an 
allegation that Mr. Garza was eligible for a persistent violator enhancement having been 
convicted of two prior felonies, and the case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.56-57, 79-100.) 
Jayme "Gus" Madler testified that he went to the Getaway Bar at around 8:00 or 
8:30 p.m. on Wednesday, February 29, 2012, in order to play "beer pong" with some 
friends. (Tr. Trial, p.256, L.1 - p.261, L.21.) When he arrived, Michael St. Peter asked 
him to go outside where Mr. St. Peter, Charles Welchert, Dustin McGuire, Megan 
Demelo, and one other person whom he could not identify, confronted him about 
whether he had something to do with Isaac Rodriguez getting into legal trouble. 1 
1 Mr. Madler had previously known most of the people in the group that confronted him 
and he had recently broken up with Maria Rodriguez, Isaac Rodriguez's sister, although 
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(Tr. Trial, p.262, L.17 - p.263, L.25.) Mr. Madler was threatened by someone in the 
group and he went back inside. (Tr. Trial, p.264, Ls.4-20.) Mr. Garza was not with the 
group of people who threatened Mr. Madler. (Tr. Trial, p.264, Ls.1-3.) 
Over the next three-and-one-half hours, Mr. Madler played beer pong, visited 
with friends, and drank beer. (Tr. Trial, p.264, L.21 - p.265, L.14.) Mr. Madler testified 
that Mr. St. Peter, Mr. Welchert, and the person he did not know were giving him dirty 
glances throughout the night. (Tr. Trial, p.267, L.13 - p.268, L.6.) He did not see 
Mr. Garza with the group until right around midnight. (Tr. Trial, p.268, Ls.7-21.) 
Mr. Madler then went outside to retrieve some cigarettes from a friend's car when the 
person he did not know came after him and took a swing at him (and missed), he took 
off running, and Mr. Garza then took a swing at him (and missed). (Tr. Trial, p.269, L.1 
- p.272, L.25.) Mr. Madler testified that was eventually tackled and "that's when I went 
lights out," meaning he was unconscious and did not know what transpired. (Tr. Trial, 
p.273, Ls.1-20.) Mr. Madler awoke to discover that he suffered significant injuries to his 
face including missing teeth, cuts to his lip, and nose, and swelling around his eyes.2 
(Tr. Trial, p.273, L.21 - p.274, L.7.) 
Mr. Madler was "obviously intoxicated" and while he was able to identify Michael 
St. Peter as one of his attackers from a photo line-up given to him at the hospital, he 
was unable to identify Mr. Garza from a photo line-up, and he only agreed that 
Mr. Garza was involved after an officer mentioned his name. (Tr. Trial, p.135, L.1 -
he was again dating her at the time of his testimony. (Tr. Trial, p.257, Ls.10-24, p.259, 
L.7 - p.260, L.3.) 
2 The extent of Mr. Madler's injuries were documented in photographs, a video taken 
while an officer was taking photographs of the injuries, and by the testimony of 
Dr. Jeffrey Dingman, who treated Mr. Madler. (Tr., p.157, L.17 - p.164, L.24, p.207, L.9 
- p.224, L.25; Exs.3-19.) 
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p.142, L12; p.147, L.18 - p.151, L.4.) The jury was presented with unfocused 
surveillance footage of the scene and Mr. Garza was identified as one of the people 
who left the bar soon after Mr. Madler; however, the footage does not capture 
Mr. Madler being tackled or actually struck. (Tr. Trial, p.225, L.18 - p.236, L.15 
(testimony of Chelsea Baker, a waitress at the Getaway Bar, who testified that she 
knew most of the people depicted in the surveillance videos including Mr. Garza, and 
identified Mr. Garza as wearing a lighter colored sweatshirt); Exs.23-26 (DVDs of 
footage taken from 4 different surveillance cameras); Ex.27 (DVD compilation of the 
footage contained in Exs.23-26).) 
At the beginning of the second day of trial, the prosecutor advised that he would 
seek to impeach Mr. Garza with his prior conviction for "unlawful shooting at an 
occupied dwelling," if Mr. Garza chose to testify. (Tr. Trial, p.251, L.16 - p.252, L.5.) 
The prosecutor agreed with the Court that Mr. Garza's conviction "falls within the 
second category of felony convictions, admissible for the fact of conviction but not the 
nature." (Tr. Trial, p.252, Ls.6-10.) Defense counsel objected and the district court 
responded by stating, 
Okay. Well, I believe that if your client takes the stand that felony 
convictions where a crime of violence falls within the second category 
recognized by our appellate courts as - which means it can be - he can 
be asked if he's ever been previously convicted of a felony but not the 
nature of the felony (sic). 
(Tr. Trial, p.252, Ls.11-23.) Defense counsel then asserted that the nature of his 
objection is that there is no case law indicating that discharge of a firearm at a dwelling 
is a violent offense, and the district court held, 
I understand your objection, but I think clearly that is a crime of 
violence that carries with it a threat of injury to people, and that's the 
reason it's made criminal. So I think it falls within that second category. 
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(Tr. Trial, p.252, L.24 - p.253, L.17.) Prior to Mr. Garza taking the stand, the district 
court stated, "[a]nd my ruling on the felony conviction is that it's a crime of violence. It 
falls within the second category which is the reason the fact of a conviction may be 
elicited but not the nature of the charge." (Tr. Trial, p.353, L.21 - p.354, L.11.) 
Mr. Garza testified that he arrived at the Getaway Bar at around 11 :30 p.m. on 
the night of the incident and that he was visiting his friends Madison Haueisen and 
Victor Pancheko. (Tr. Trial, p.355, L.8 - p.356, L.17.) Mr. Garza knows Mr. St. Peter, 
Mr. Schink, and Ms. Demelo, and he knows of Mr. McGuire, but he did not know 
Mr. Welchert, and he did not go to the bar to. meet with them as they were not friends. 
(Tr. Trial, p.356, L.24 - p.358, L.23.) Some of the people in the group came up to 
Mr. Garza and stated that Isaac Rodriguez had been arrested because someone had 
"told on him" and stated that there may be a fight with Mr. Madler. (Tr. Trial, p.358, L.1 
- p.359, L.10.) Mr. Garza testified that he told the group members that whatever they 
did was their choice, but that he did not want to get into any trouble. (Tr. Trial, p.361, 
L.22 - p.362, L.9.) Mr. Garza was aware that Mr. St. Peter and the other group 
members were known to get into fights. (Tr. Trial, p.363, Ls.9-20.) 
Mr. Garza admitted that he followed the group outside believing that there would 
be a one-on-one fight and that he wanted to see what was going on. (Tr. Trial, p.364, 
L.15 - p.365, L.22.) Mr. Garza denied that he was trying to cut-off Mr. Madler although 
he admitted that the surveillance video made it appear that he was. (Tr. Trial, p.367, 
L.19 - p.368, L.4.) He did not see Mr. Madler get tackled but he did see him being 
stomped on by at least two people while unconscious, and Mr. Garza took off running. 
(Tr. Trial, p.368, L.24 - p.369, L.22.) He denied striking Mr. Madler in any way, stating 
that it was Mr. St. Peter and at least one other who did so. (Tr. Trial, p.369, L.23 -
4 
p.370, L.18.) Mr. Garza returned to the Getaway Bar later that night while the police 
were there and he met up again with Ms. Haueisen and her sister. (Tr. Trial, p.371, L.9 
- p.372, L.22.) He eventually got in his truck, which was parked near where the battery 
occurred, and he left with Ms. Haueisen's sister without being stopped or questioned by 
the police. (Tr. Trial, p.373, L.8 - p.374, L.14.) 
The prosecutor began his cross-examination first by verifying that he had never 
spoken with Mr. Garza3, and then by asking "[a]nd let's get something off the table here. 
You're a convicted felon, aren't you?" to which Mr. Garza answered, "Yes, I am." 
(Tr. Trial, p.375, Ls.11-16.) 
Madison Haueisen testified that she met up with Mr. Garza and others at the 
Getaway on the night in question and that she later heard about Mr. Madler being 
attacked but that she did not witness it occur. (Tr. Trial, p.385, L.1 - p.388, L.7.) She 
saw Mr. Garza at around closing time, he did not look disheveled, and he did not have 
any blood on him. (Tr. Trial, p.388, L.22 - p.389, L.4.) She did not recall any 
conversation about a fight that night. (Tr. Trial, p.389, Ls.5-6.) There was no indication 
that Mr. Garza had been involved in any fight. (Tr. Trial, p.390, Ls.18-24.) 
The prosecutor concluded his rebuttal closing argument by noting that the jurors 
are the ones who have to make credibility determinations, "[a]nd I'll also submit to you -
and this is something you can consider - who has the felony conviction in this case? 
Thank you very much." (Tr. Trial, p.435, L.23 - p.436, L.9.) The jury found Mr. Garza 
3 Although there does not appear to be any legal relevance to whether Mr. Garza and 
the prosecutor had met before, and the inquiry could be construed as a comment on 
Mr. Garza's post-arrest, pre-trial silence raising an inference of his guilt, defense 
counsel did not object and the prosecutor made no further inquiry into the fact that 
Mr. Garza had not previously spoken to the prosecutor. Therefore, Mr. Garza does not 
raise any issue related to this question in this appeal. 
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guilty of aggravated battery by aiding and abetting, but not guilty of aggravated battery 
by personally committing the battery. (R., pp.141-142; Tr. Trial, p.443, L.21 - p.444, 
L.22.) The jurors additionally found that Mr. Garza had two prior felony convictions at 
the conclusion of Part II of the trial. (R., pp.143-144; Tr. Trial, p.446, L.16 - p.471, 
L.14.) Mr. Garza was sentenced to a unified term of fifteen years, with five years fixed, 
and he filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.162-163, 173-176.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it allowed the State to present evidence pursuant to I.RE. 
609 and over defense objection, that Mr. Garza was a convicted felon, as his felony 
conviction was for a crime of violence and, thus, did not weigh on his credibility? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The State To Present 
Evidence Pursuant To I.R.E. 609 And Over Defense Objection, That Mr. Garza Was A 
Convicted Felon, As His Felony Conviction Was For A Crime Of Violence And, Thus, 
Did Not Weigh On His Credibility 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Garza had previously been convicted of unlawful discharge of a firearm at a 
dwelling-house, in violation if Idaho Code § 18-3317. The district court correctly found 
that this conviction was for a crime of violence. However, the district court abused its 
discretion when it allowed the prosecutor to present evidence that Mr. Garza was a 
convicted felon because unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling-house is a crime 
of violence and, thus, has no bearing on Mr. Garza's credibility. Permitting the State to 
present this evidence violated I.R.E. 609 and the State will be unable to prove that the 
district court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. Applicable Jurisprudence 
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
lower court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 
584, 590 (2013) (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).) "'A trial court 
does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) acts 
within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and 
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Id. (quoting Fazzio v. Mason, 
150 Idaho 591,594 (2011).) 
Idaho Criminal Rule 609(a) reads as follows: 
For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of the 
fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the nature of the 
felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public 
record, but only if the court determines in a hearing outside the presence 
of the jury that the fact of the prior conviction or the nature of the prior 
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conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of the witness and that 
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial 
effect to the party offering the witness. If the evidence of the fact of a prior 
felony conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, is admitted for the 
purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or proceeding, the party 
shall have the option to present evidence of the nature of the conviction, 
but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall not be 
admissible. 
1.R.E. 609 (a). The Idaho Supreme Court has established three categories of felonies 
as they relate to the credibility of the witness. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 631 
(1999) (citing State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573 (1981)). The first category involves crimes 
such as perjury which are '"intimately connected' with the issue of credibility. Id. 
(quoting Ybarra, 102 Idaho at 580.) The second category "involves crimes such as 
robbery or burglary which are 'somewhat less relevant' to the issue of credibility." Id. 
The third category relate to acts of violence which generally do not relate to the 
credibility of the witness. Id. (citations omitted). 
The trial court must make two determinations: First, whether the nature of the 
conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility; second, whether the probative value of 
the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. 132 Idaho at 630. The district court's 
determination that the prior conviction is relevant is reviewed de nova, while the district 
court's determination of the probative value versus its prejudicial effect is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. Id. 
C. The District Court Erred In Determining That Violation Of I.C. § 18-3317 Falls Into 
The "Second Category" And Mr. Garza's Conviction For This Crime Was Not 
Relevant To His Credibility 
Although the district court did not specifically cite to I.R.E. 609, Thompson or 
Ybarra, the court's finding that unlawful discharge of a firearm at a dwelling house is a 
"crime of violence [which] falls within the second category recognized by our appellate 
courts" and thus "he can be asked if he's ever been previously convicted of a felony but 
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not the nature of the felony" (Tr. Trial, p.251, L.16 - p.252, L.20), demonstrates that the 
court was applying the Ybarra analysis to Rule 609.4 The district court's conclusion that 
a violation of I.C. § 19-3317 is a "crime of violence" for purposes of I.R. 609 is not 
challenged in this appeal. I.C. § 19-3317 reads as follows, 
It shall be unlawful for any person to intentionally and unlawfully discharge 
a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied 
motor vehicle, inhabited mobile home, inhabited travel trailer, or inhabited 
camper. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty 
of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not 
to exceed fifteen (15) years. 
As used in this section, "inhabited" means currently being used for 
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. 
I.C. § 18-3317. Although "crime of violence" is not specifically defined in Thompson, 
shooting a firearm into a dwelling, whether currently occupied or not, is not the type of 
conduct that weighs one way or the other a person's credibility or truthfulness. Unlike 
"crimes such as perjury which are 'intimately connected' with credibility issues" or 
"crimes such as robbery or burglary which are 'somewhat less relevant' to the issue of 
credibility," shooting firearm into a dwelling has ""'little to no direct bearing on honesty 
and veracity.""' State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho at 631 (quoting State v. Ybarra, 102 
Idaho at 580-581 (in turn quoting People v. Rollo, 569 P.2d 771, 775)). Thus, de novo 
review of I.C. § 18-3317 demonstrates that the district court correctly found that a 
violation of I.C. § 18-3317 is a "crime of violence" under the Ybarra analysis. 
However, the district court erred in determining that Mr. Garza's conviction for 
unlawful discharge of a firearm at dwelling is relevant to Mr. Garza's credibility. Crimes 
4 The Ybarra case was decided in 1981 and precedes the adoption of I.R.E. 609, which 
occurred in 1985. However, in the Thompson case decided in 1998, the Court applied 
the Ybarra analysis to an issue raised pursuant to I.R.E. 606. Thus, the standards 
originally announced in Ybarra apply to evidence admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 609. 
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of violence do not, as the court found, fall into Ybarra's "second category"; rather, 
crimes of violence fall into the third category, i.e., they have little to no direct bearing on 
credibility. State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho at 631. Because shooting a firearm at a 
dwelling house has no bearing on Mr. Garza's credibility, the district court erred in 
determining that jurors could consider the fact that Mr. Garza is a convicted felon when 
weighing his credibility. 
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Present 
Evidence That Mr. Garza Is A Convicted Felon 
As Mr. Garza's prior conviction for shooting a firearm at a dwelling house had no 
relevance to his credibility and was not admissible pursuant to I.RE. 609, the district 
court acted outside the bounds of its discretion when it allowed the State to present 
evidence that Mr. Garza was a convicted felon. Therefore, the district court abused its 
discretion when it allowed the State to present this irrelevant evidence, over defense 
counsel's objection. 
E. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Was Harmless Beyond A 
Reasonable Doubt 
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the 
appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 
(2010). 
Under the Chapman harmless error analysis, where a constitutional 
violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, a 
reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves "beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained." 
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State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 598 (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010) (in 
turn quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).) Indeed, the United States 
Supreme Court has held, 
The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without 
the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that 
was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to 
support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee. 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1993) (citations omitted). 
The State will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district 
court's erroneous decision to allow the jury to hear that Mr. Garza is convicted felon did 
not contribute to the verdict. The prosecutor recognized that the jurors would have to 
make a credibility determination as Mr. Garza's testimony differed from evidence 
presented by the State, and the prosecutor argued to the jury, "[a]nd I'll also submit to 
you - and this is something you can consider - who has the felony conviction in this 
case? Thank you very much." (R., pp.141-142; Tr. Trial, p.435, L.23 - p.436, L.9.) 
Where the State itself stressed the importance of Mr. Garza's felony conviction to the 
jurors when making credibility determinations, the State will not be able to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the jurors' consideration of the fact that Mr. Garza is a 
convicted felon, did not contribute to their determination that he was guilty of aiding and 
abetting the aggravated battery in this case. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Garza respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and remand 
his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of December, 2013. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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